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‘Is democracy in crisis? This question is being posed with increasing urgency by some of the 
leading statesmen of the West, by columnists and scholars, and – if public opinion polls are to 
be trusted – even by the publics’, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of The Trilateral 
Commission in his introductory note to Crozier et al. (1975) 
 
As the introductory quote illustrates, crisis talk is nothing new for Western democracies. In 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, social scientists across the Western world perceived a crisis of 
democracy. The progressive erosion of the democratic state’s capacity to implement adequate 
policies was the underlying common thread in the different versions of this crisis talk (see 
Crozier et al. 1975, Habermas 1973, Offe 1972). This scholarly debate on the crisis in 
Western democracies had triggered a large-scale investigation into the relationship between 
the citizens and the state in Western Europe. But when the results of this program were 
eventually published in the mid-1990s, the world had fundamentally changed as a result of 
the third wave of democratization, and the scholarly debate had moved on to problems linked 
to democratic transition and consolidation. Another reason why the question of the crisis of 
democracy had lost its urgency was the lack of clear empirical evidence in support of the 
claim of a progressively worsening crisis of state authority/legitimacy in Western demo-
cracies. Nor was state power unambiguously eroding in these countries. The results of the 
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‘Beliefs in Government program’ actually rather confirmed the authors’ ‘normality 
hypothesis’, which they opposed to the ‘crisis hypothesis’: Western representative 
democracies proved to be perfectly capable of absorbing and assimilating growing pressure 
from societal problems, and the forms of political expression taken by such pressure could be 
understood as the normal manifestations of democracy in complex societies (Fuchs and 
Klingemann 1995).  
Nevertheless, the question of ‘disaffected democracies’ did not go away. In 2000, a follow-up 
study to the original Crisis of democracy was primarily preoccupied by the lack of public 
confidence in leaders and institutions of democratic governance (Pharr and Putnam 2000). 
The study argued that the causes for the decline of confidence did not lie in the social fabric, 
nor were they the result of general economic conditions. The problem, it suggested, was with 
government and politics themselves. In the same vein, the contributors to yet another study 
on ‘political disaffection in contemporary democracies’ (Torcal and Montero 2006) 
highlighted the decisive role of politics and institutions in shaping political disaffection. 
However, even if many citizens have become less satisfied with the way democracy works, 
research on dissatisfaction with democracy has consistently shown that support for demo-
cracy as a principle remains widespread in Europe (Klingemann 1999, Dalton 2004). In his 
more recent analysis of 2008 World Value Survey data, Klingemann (2014) confirms that the 
values of an overwhelming part of European citizens are congruent with democratic 
principles.  
In the meantime, the context conditions have changed again, and since the fall of Lehman 
Brothers in fall 2008, it is the economic crisis of the Great Recession which has been said to 
threaten democracy in Europe. The question of ‘the crisis of democracy’ has now become the 
question of whether, under the conditions of economic hardship, Europeans have become less 
supportive of democratic principles and/or more critical of the quality of democracy in their 
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own countries. To put this question into perspective, I shall distinguish between four regions 
of Europe. When it comes to the assessment of democratic support and discontent, it is 
important to distinguish between Northwestern Europe (NWE), Southern Europe (SE) and 
Central- and Eastern Europe (CEE). In addition, within CEE we should distinguish between 
the more or less democratic countries and the authoritarian regimes in Europe’s neighborhood 
(Russia, Kosovo and Ukraine), for which we also have data on the relevant democratic 
attitudes. These four regions have different democratic legacies – the CEE countries have 
made their transition to democracy only in the early 1990s. Similarly, several countries of SE 
(Spain, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus) have been governed by authoritarian regimes until the mid-
1970s. Moreover, it is well known that SE and CEE countries have been hit much harder by 
the Great Recession and the Euro crisis than NWE. Most importantly, however, the Euro 
crisis had a very different political impact in the three regions, as is illustrated by Figure 1, 
which shows the development of satisfaction with democracy (SWD) – a proxy for the 
general assessment of domestic democracy1. The vertical line in this figure points to the 
beginning of the Great Recession in fall 2008.  
 <Figures 1> 
In NWE, majorities of the citizens have been rather satisfied with the way their national 
democracy works throughout the period covered (2000-2015). The economic crisis has not 
substantially changed the overall pattern in these countries. By contrast, the level of 
satisfaction with the way national democracy works has been much lower in the CEE 
countries throughout the period covered, the share of those fairly/very satisfied hovering 
always around one third of the citizenry. The Great Recession did not change much in this 
                                                          
1 This indicator has been heavily criticized in the literature. Ferrín (2016: 306) has submitted this 
indicator to a detailed test. The good news of her test is that ‘SWD seems to provide a relatively reliable 
measure of citizens’ perceptions of how well the liberal dimension of democracy works in their country’ . For 
our purposes, it is suboptimal that the Eurobarometer data which I use here is rather incomplete. Thus, there are 
no data for the important period between fall 2007 and fall 2011. 
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respect in these countries either. This pattern points to a deep-seated disenchantment of CEE 
citizens with democratic politics that does not date from the Great Recession and the Euro 
crisis. Finally, SE presents a third pattern, which is distinct from that in both of the other 
regions. The Southern Europeans’ satisfaction with their national democracy has dramatically 
decreased since the onset of the Great Recession and reached the low level of CEE countries 
by 2011. To be sure, there are country-specific variations within each one of the regions – 
variations I cannot go into here for lack of space. The key point to be retained is that, in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession, the dramatic disenchantment with their national (and, we 
might add, with European) politics sets the Southern Europeans apart. In the aftermath of the 
Great Recession, they have become disillusioned politically, with respect to both domestic 
and European politics.  
I shall analyze the implications of the Euro crisis for European public opinion about 
democracy at the national level in more detail. I shall do so in the tradition of the studies of 
democratic support and discontent which I have already referred to. Compared to the studies 
cited above, I can rely on data of exceptional quality from the 6th round of the European 
Social Survey (ESS6), which has been put into the field in 2012, i.e. at a time, when Europe 
still was in the grips of the Euro crisis, although, as a result of the policy measures taken, 
financial stability was slowly improving. This survey provides a detailed account of how 
Europeans in 29 countries view and evaluate democracy. First, I shall present an overview 
over the Europeans’ views and evaluations of democracy. Then, I shall assess the effects of 
economic and political satisfaction on the evaluations and the conceptions of the various 
models of democracy. For this purpose, I shall first discuss a set of expectations before 
turning to the analysis of the results. 
 
The Europeans’ overall views and evaluations of democracy 
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In order to simplify Easton’s (1975) distinction between diffuse and specific support, Ferrín 
and Kriesi (2016) propose two alternative concepts, which they believe are much easier to 
identify empirically. They propose to distinguish between conceptions (views) and 
evaluations of democracy. Conceptions of democracy refer to the citizens’ normative ideal of 
democracy, their support of democratic principles. Evaluations of democracy, instead, refer 
to the citizens’ assessment of the way democracy works in their own country. The ESS6 has 
implemented this distinction. This survey is based on a multidimensional conception of 
democracy that distinguishes between the different components of the basic model of liberal 
democracy, and adds a few questions about visions of democracy going beyond the basic 
model – social democracy and direct democracy. For each of the components, Europeans in 
29 countries were asked two sets of questions about democracy2: to elicit their conceptions of 
democracy, respondents were asked to indicate how important they considered a given 
component (e.g. free and fair elections) to be for democracy in general3; to elicit their 
evaluations of democracy, they were asked to assess the situation with respect to this aspect 
in their own country4. Before presenting some key results of this study, let us note that the 
Europeans have been up to their task: Hernandez (2016) has shown that the democratic belief 
systems of most Europeans who answered these questions are broad ranging and coherently 
organized. 
                                                          
2The 29 countries include 12 NWE countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland, the 
Nordic countries (Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland), Ireland and the UK), five SE countries 
(Italy, Portugal and Spain, Cyprus and neighbouring Israel) and 12 CEE countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, and neighbouring Albania, Kosovo, Russia and 
Ukraine). 
3 The importance questions used the formulation ‘How important is [x] for democracy in general’ and the 
responses were measured using an 11 point scale labelled as ‘Not at all important for democracy in general (0) - 
Extremely important for democracy in general (10)’. 
4 The evaluation questions used the following formulation: please tell me to what extent you think each of the 
following statements applies in [country].  0 means you think the statement does not apply at all and 10 means 
you think it applies completely. 
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In the ESS6, the respondents were confronted with twelve components of liberal democracy 
– five liberal components (rule of law, checks and balances, media freedom and media 
reliability, and minority protection) and seven components covering the dual processes of 
accountability and responsiveness (free and fair elections, freedom of opposition, parties 
offering clear alternatives, governments explaining their decisions to the voters, voters 
discussing politics before deciding how to vote, voters having the possibility to sanction 
governments, and politicians taking into account the views of other European governments 
before making decisions)5. Together, these twelve components have been shown to form a 
hierarchical scale. The resulting scale follows the essentialist logic of democratic theory and 
takes into account only the components which someone considers “extremely important”.  
The scale ranges from the two items considered most important across Europe (rule of law, 
free and fair elections) to the items considered least important (alternative partisan offers, 
citizens discussions, and responsibility to other European governments) (Kriesi et al. 2016). 
Moreover, this hierarchy has been shown to be more or less identical across all 29 countries 
of the study. In other words, the Europeans share a common understanding of the basic model 
of liberal democracy. 
On average, Europeans consider all twelve components of the model as quite important for 
democracy. On the 11-point scale, the average value for all components is 8.3, and there are 
hardly any regional differences in this respect (see Table 1). On average, roughly five of the 
twelve components are considered ‘extremely important’, which corresponds to a value of 4.3 
on a scale running from 0 (no element is extremely important) to 10 (all 12 components are 
considered extremely important). As is shown by the second column in Table 1, there are 
regional differences with respect to this more appropriate measure of support for the 
principles of liberal democracy: Southern and Eastern Europeans are more supportive of the 
                                                          




principles of liberal democracy than North-Western Europeans. Note also, that citizens from 
authoritarian countries are almost as supportive of the principles of liberal democracy as the 
citizens in the rest of Europe.  
 <Table 1> 
When it comes to evaluations, however, the twelve components (ranging from -5=”does not 
apply at all” to +5=”applies completely”) are clearly better evaluated in NWE, where they 
reach an average of 1.88 compared to .68 in SE and .53 in CEE. Not unexpectedly, the 
Nordic countries are the ones with the best average evaluations – Sweden (2.6), Norway 
(2.5), Denmark (2.4) and Finland (2.3). In the three authoritarian countries in CEE, the 
average evaluations are worse than everywhere else and even reach negative values (=-.67). 
In other words, Europeans are highly sensitive to the quality of democracy in their own 
country, and they know a deficient democracy when they experience it. But note that there is 
room for improvement even in the best performing countries, since even the Nordic countries 
fall considerably short of the maximum on the scale (=5).  
In the second part of Table 1, analogous data are presented for social democracy. In the case 
of this democratic model, the set of items in the ESS6 was limited to only two – protection 
against poverty and measures to reduce income inequality6. The index for this model of 
democracy just corresponds to the average raw values of the two items. As is shown, on 
average, these two items are considered even more important for democracy in general than 
the components of the liberal democracy model, above all in SE and in the authoritarian 
countries of CEE. In the view of the Europeans, the social democratic model complements 
the liberal democratic model, since the corresponding indices are correlated to the order of 
r=.64. The Europeans’ model of democracy includes the substantive elements of social 
                                                          
6Both items were asked in the same format as the liberal democracy items in the rotating module. 
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democracy, too. As the raw scores, but above all the index values show, the support for the 
principles of social democracy is much stronger in SE and CEE than in NWE. 
The social democratic model fares much worse than the liberal democratic model when it 
comes to evaluation. The average evaluation of the two social-democratic elements is 
negative across Europe. Only in NWE, they are positively evaluated, but even in the best 
performing Nordic countries the average evaluation rises only slightly above +1. In SE and 
CEE, and most pronouncedly in the authoritarian countries, the evaluation of the social 
democratic components of democracy is clearly negative. When it comes to a democratic 
deficit in Europe at the time of the Euro crisis, it is above all a deficit in terms of the social 
democratic components.  
The third part of Table 1 presents the same set of data for the model of direct democracy. For 
this model, we had just one item. This model, too, is considered important across Europe, 
even if somewhat less so than the basic model of liberal democracy. Like the other two 
models, Southern and Eastern Europeans consider it more important than Europeans in NWE. 
Moreover, this model also tends to be seen as a complement of the basic model since the 
overall correlation between liberal and direct democracy amounts to r=.44. With respect to 
evaluations, the direct democratic model is situated in between the other two. In each region, 
it fares better than the social democratic model, but worse than the liberal democratic one.  
 
The role of economic and political satisfaction for the citizens’ evaluations and 
conceptions of democracy 
The model I propose to study the effect of the crisis on the citizens’ evaluations and 
conceptions of democracy is presented in Figure 2. This model includes both evaluations and 
conceptions of democracy (support of democratic principles) as dependent variables and 
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considers them as interdependent. As proposed previously (Kriesi and Saris 2016: 194-204), 
the model assumes that conceptions and evaluations have a reciprocal effect on each other, 
which may be conditioned by the quality of democracy (which varies between the region-
specific groups of countries). For the present purposes, this reciprocal relationship is not at 
the centre of our attention, but we need to take it into account, if we want to properly estimate 
the effects of the economic crisis on the two aspects of democratic support. Taking this 
interdependent relationship into account, the model suggests that, in the short run, both 
evaluations and conceptions of democracy crucially depend on two types of instrumental 
considerations on the part of the citizens: their satisfaction with 
• the performance of the economy 
• the government’s performance 
 
Expected impact of performance on evaluations 
Let us first consider the impact of performance on evaluations of democracy. One may expect 
that the citizens’ evaluations of democracy directly depend on both instrumental 
considerations: the better the perceived performance of the economy and the government, the 
better probably one’s evaluation of domestic democracy. The two instrumental considerations 
are interrelated to the extent that the satisfaction with the government’s performance depends 
on the satisfaction with the economy and partly mediates its impact on the evaluation of 
democracy. In part at least, citizens attribute responsibility for the economic well-being of 
their country to their political authorities, i.e. to the government. This is the basic mechanism 
behind economic voting (Duch and Stevenson 2008, Lewis-Back and Stegmaier 2007). 
Satisfaction with the government, in turn, is expected to directly influence the citizens’ 
assessment of how democracy works. However, citizens are unlikely to attribute all the 
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responsibility for the economic performance to the government in place, which means that 
the economy can be expected to have a direct effect on the evaluation of democracy, too.  
 <Figure 2> 
The model also includes a number of controls, some of which are directly related to the 
evaluation side. Thus, it is well known that citizens who have voted for the incumbent 
government, i.e. citizens who belong to the winners in the last elections, are more satisfied 
with democracy than electoral losers (Anderson et al. 2005). Their satisfaction with the way 
democracy works in their country is, of course, mediated by their greater satisfaction with the 
incumbent government, but it is possible that they are more satisfied with democracy more 
generally, independently of how the current government performs. In addition, it is also well 
known that institutional trust heavily influences performance evaluations: trusting citizens are 
more likely to give the government and the democratic institutions the benefit of the doubt. 
Moreover, an individual’s general life satisfaction is also likely to spill over to her 
satisfaction with more specific aspects of life, such as the economy’s or the government’s 
performance. Finally, it is likely that one’s level of education influences one’s assessment of 
democracy: the higher one’s level of education, the more critical one tends to be in terms of 
democratic evaluations (Norris 2011: 129-33). 
These considerations apply to all countries. However, one may expect the corresponding 
effects to vary according to the quality of democracy in a given country and according to the 
vision of democracy at stake. First, it is likely that the citizens’ assessment of the economic 
performance of their country has a stronger impact on their evaluations of democracy in 
countries where the overall quality of democracy is low. As has been argued by Magalhães 
(2016, 2016a) based on arguments from social psychology, when people perceive procedures 
as fair, allowing them voice and influence, they become more likely to discount poor 
performance in favour of expected future positive outcomes. They are also less likely to 
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believe that outcomes could have been more favourable, and thus less likely to hold 
authorities directly responsible for negative outcomes. Moreover, if procedures are perceived 
as fair, material outcomes can lose importance in favour of intangible benefits. This means 
that we can expect a stronger impact of the economic and government performance on the 
evaluations of democracy in low quality democracies than in high quality democracies. I.e. 
the impact of economic and government performance should be stronger in SE, CEE and 
especially in authoritarian countries than in NWE.  
Second and related to this first point, we may expect the citizens’ assessment of the economic 
performance of their country to have a stronger impact on the evaluations of social 
democracy than on the evaluations of liberal and direct democracy. This expectation is based 
on the fact that the social democratic model is less of a procedural and more of an output-
based model. The economic and political performance of a country is likely to have a more 
direct impact on output-related aspects of democracy than on purely procedural ones.  
Four hypotheses summarize the expected effect of performance considerations on the 
evaluations of democracy: 
H1: satisfaction with government and economic performance has a positive impact on 
the individuals’ evaluation of how democracy works in their own country. 
H2: the effect of satisfaction with the economy on the evaluation of how democracy 
works is partly mediated by satisfaction with the government. 
H3: satisfaction with government and economic performance has a stronger effect on 
the evaluation of democracy in low quality democracies and in authoritarian regimes. 
H4: satisfaction with government and economic performance has a stronger effect on 





Expected impact on conceptions 
As Easton (1975: 446) had already suggested, diffuse and specific support are related to the 
extent that diffuse support is not only based on normative beliefs, but is also ‘a product of 
spill-over effects from evaluations of a series of outputs and of performance over a long 
period of time’. With respect to democratic support, this implies that the better the long-term 
economic performance in a democracy, the greater is not only the expected satisfaction of the 
citizens with their regime, but also their support of democratic principles. Conversely, as Linz 
(1978: 54) has observed: ‘Unsolved structural problems… undermine the efficacy and, in the 
long run, the legitimacy of the regime….’ According to this ‘spill-over hypothesis’, we 
should observe that an economic crisis like the Euro crisis tends to undermine the citizens’ 
support for democratic principles. However, poor performance may have actually the exact 
opposite effect of what this ‘spill-over hypothesis’ suggests: economic difficulties in a given 
country may reduce the tolerance of the citizens for poor governance and enhance support for 
democratic principles by increasing the number of critical citizens, i.e. citizens who value 
democracy as an ideal yet remain dissatisfied with the performance of their political and 
economic systems (Norris 1999, Klingemann 1999, Dalton 2004, Fuchs and Roller 2006). As 
Royo (2014) argues for the case of Spain, the citizens tolerated the ‘extractive behavior’ of 
Spanish political elites and the general ‘institutional degeneration’ in Spanish politics as long 
as the economy went well. Only when the economic crisis exposed an unsustainable 
economic model, the public became outraged by the actions of its elites. The economic crisis 
might in fact draw the citizens’ attention to the way democracy works in their own country, 
which, in turn, may increase the cognitive accessibility of democratic principles, and increase 
the support for democratic principles. As it happened in Spain, at the height of the crisis, a 
movement arose in spring 2011 that asked for ‘real democracy now’. 
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The extent and direction of these contrasting effects may, in turn, again be moderated by the 
type and quality of the regime. According to the ‘spill-over’ hypothesis, good performance 
can be expected to enhance the support of democratic principles in democracies, but not in 
authoritarian countries. In the latter, good performance might on the contrary enhance the 
support for the authoritarian regime and undermine the support of democratic principles. 
Magalhães (2014: 80) has, indeed, shown that this holds true. In his study, the spill-over 
effects depend on the indicators used and are weak for non-democracies, but they are 
significant: in democracies, greater levels of performance increase diffuse support for 
democracy, while the opposite is the case in non-democracies.  
Let me summarize these expectations in two contrasting hypotheses, plus an sub-hypothesis 
specifically devoted to authoritarian regimes: 
H5 (‘spill-over’): dissatisfaction with government and economic performance 
undermines the conceptions of democracy  
H5a (‘spill-over’ a): in authoritarian regimes, satisfaction with government and 
economic performance undermines the conceptions of democracy 
H6 (‘critical citizens’): dissatisfaction with government and economic performance 
generally enhances the conceptions of democracy 
The model also includes a number of controls on the conception side. These refer to 
education, political interest, left-right self-placement and left-right self-placement squared, as 
well as an indicator designed to correct for the over-reporting of extreme scale-values. 
Educated and politically interested citizens are more likely to hold elaborate views of 
democracy, because they have the capacity and the motivation to develop such views. 
Controls for left-right self-placement rely on Ceka and Magalhães (2016: 105), who have 
shown that people who self-identify at the extremes of the left-right scale are likely to be 
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more demanding on both the liberal democratic and the direct democratic dimensions of 
democracy than those who are ideological moderates, while people on the left are more likely 
to see social justice as extremely important for democracy. Finally, controls for over-
reporting extreme scale values (=10’s) have to be introduced, given that there is a widespread 
tendency among ESS respondents to over-report such values7. 
 
Testing the model: results 
For the test of these expectations, I use a summary indicator for the citizens’ (‘socio-tropic’) 
assessment of the economic situation, which simply asks about their satisfaction with the 
state of the economy in their own country. Responses are recorded on a 0-10 scale. Figure 3 
shows how this indicator is distributed in the four regions covered by the ESS6 data – the 
three European regions, plus the authoritarian neighbourhood, at the time of the interviews in 
2012. As this figure indicates, the NWE distribution clearly differs from the distributions in 
the other three regions: in NWE the citizens’ assessments are skewed in a positive direction 
with a mean of 5.1 on the 0-10 scale. In the other three regions, the distributions are skewed 
in a negative direction with means of 2.9 in SE, 3.1 in authoritarian countries, and 3.4 in 
CEE. In SE, the modal value is 0, which illustrates the great economic pessimism that reigned 
in this part of Europe at the time the survey was put into the field in the midst of the Euro 
crisis.  
 <Figure 3> 
Satisfaction with the government’s performance8 and satisfaction with life are equally 
measured on an 11-point scale. The satisfaction with the electoral outcome is a dummy 
                                                          
7 See Kriesi et al. 2016: fn9, p. 74. 
8The satisfaction with the government is based on the following question: Now thinking about the [country] 
government8, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job? And satisfaction with life is based on this 
question: Now all things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? Responses are 
also recorded on a 0-10 scale. 
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variable, which takes the value of 1 for electoral winners and 0 otherwise9. Institutional trust 
is a factor extracted from the battery of five trust items in the general part of the ESS10. Level 
of education is measured on a five-point scale and political interest on a four-point scale. All 
substantive independent variables have been recoded to the 0-1 range, which means that the 
estimated coefficients correspond to the maximum effect of these variables as we move from 
its minimum (0) to its maximum (1). Table A2 in the Appendix presents an overview over the 
variables in the model. 
The models have been estimated for each one of the four regions separately by the sem-
procedure in stata. The advantage of the sem-procedure is that it allows for the calculation of 
direct, indirect and total effects. Thus, for the two performance variables – satisfaction with 
the government and with the economy, I have not only calculated their direct, but also their 
total effects11.  Table 2 presents the direct effects of the sem-models for the evaluations and 
conceptions of liberal democracy.  
 <Table 2> 
With regard to the evaluations of liberal democracy, the table first shows that all perfor-
mance-related effects are highly significant, and all of them have the expected positive sign: 
as expected, satisfaction with governmental and economic performance increases the 
satisfaction with the way liberal democracy works, and vice versa. Second, as expected, too, 
the effects increase as we move from the higher quality democracies in NWE to the lower 
quality democracies in SE, CEE, and the authoritarian countries. In higher quality 
democracies, citizens, indeed, tend to have a less instrumental approach to liberal democracy 
                                                          
9 The indicator for satisfaction with the electoral outcome, i.e. the indicator for electoral winners, is based on the 
party voted for in the last elections or, if not voted in the last election, the party one feels close at the time of the 
interview. 
10 This battery includes parliament, the legal system, the policy, politicians, and political parties. The five items 
form a strong factor. 
11 Assuming uncorrelated residuals, the calculation of indirect effects is straight-forward (see Duncan 1975): one 
just multiplies the regression coefficients along corresponding causal paths. The sem-procedure provides the 
estimates for total effects as well as their standard errors. 
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than citizens in countries with a lower quality of democracy. Third, comparing the effects of 
economic and government performance, we observe that, in all the regions, the direct effects 
of economic performance are lower than the corresponding effects of government 
performance. One reason for this is that the effect of satisfaction with the economy is partly 
mediated by satisfaction with the government. This can be seen in Figure 4a, which presents 
the direct and total effects of the two performance indicators on the evaluations of liberal 
democracy. The effect of satisfaction with the economy increases in all regions, once we take 
its indirect effects into account as well: it more than doubles in SE and CEE, and it reaches 
almost the same order of magnitude as the effect of satisfaction with the government in 
authoritarian countries. The evaluation of liberal democracy appears to be particularly 
vulnerable to poor performance in authoritarian countries. In authoritarian countries, the 
maximum effect of the combined political and economic dissatisfaction is 3.4 (1.728+1.646) 
on the -5 to +5 scale, as compared to 1.1 (.446+.630) in NWE countries.  
 <Figure 4> 
With regard to the conceptions of democracy, Figure 4b shows that, with two exceptions, all 
performance-related effects are negative. This is strong support for the ‘critical citizens’ 
hypothesis. The direct and total effects of satisfaction with the government are equally 
negative in NWE, SE, and CEE Europe, and the direct effects of satisfaction with the 
economy are even more pronouncedly negative in SE, CEE and authoritarian countries. The 
total effects of economic satisfaction reach up to -2.68 in authoritarian, -2.53 in SE and -2.41 
in CEE countries. This means that, as predicted by the ‘critical citizens’ hypothesis, economic 
dissatisfaction is actually increasing the support for democratic principles. This clearly 
contradicts Magalhães’ results12. In other words, economic dissatisfaction strongly enhances 
                                                          
12 This may be due to the different measures we use for the support of democratic principles. At the end of his 
paper, Magalhães (2014: 93) himself criticizes the existing survey measures of regime support and pleads for 
better measures. In my view, the measures provided by the ESS clearly improve on the existing measures. 
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support for democratic principles, except in NWE where the economic distress has been more 
limited anyway. In this part of Europe, there is a positive direct spill-over effect of economic 
performance on the support of democratic principles. In other words, in NWE Magalhães’ 
overall result for democracies holds. But it holds only with respect to the direct effect of 
economic satisfaction, which is counteracted by the indirect effect via satisfaction with 
government, because the latter has a negative effect on democratic conceptions. As a result, 
the total effect of satisfaction with economic performance is virtually zero in NWE.  
The other exceptionally positive effect concerns the effect of satisfaction with government in 
authoritarian countries: contrary to expectations and contrary to Magalhães’ results (see H5a) 
and for reasons I ignore, in these countries satisfaction with the government directly promotes 
support for democratic principles. Note, however, that this positive effect is counter-acted by 
an indirect negative effect so that, in the end, satisfaction with the government has hardly any 
effect on support for liberal democratic principles in authoritarian countries. The indirect 
effect operates via the evaluation of the way democracy works: in authoritarian countries, 
citizens who are satisfied with the government are also satisfied with the way democracy 
works and, therefore, less demanding in terms of democracy.  
The critical citizens’ hypothesis is enhanced by the fact that, not only in authoritarian 
countries but in all regions except SE, evaluations generally have a negative effect on 
conceptions: the more dissatisfied democrats are more demanding in terms of liberal 
democracy than the more satisfied ones. In SE, the effect is not significant. By contrast, 
independently of performance considerations, in all four regions the more demanding citizens 
tend to be more satisfied with the way liberal democracy works in their country than the less 
demanding ones. They generally seem to give the governments the benefit of the doubt.  
Turning briefly to the effect of the control variables, they all show the expected signs. Thus, 
evaluations of liberal democracy are enhanced among electoral winners, especially in lower 
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quality democracies and authoritarian countries (confirming the results of Anderson et al. 
2005). Institutional trust improves evaluations, as does satisfaction with life (except for 
authoritarian countries), while higher levels of education render citizens more skeptical. The 
effect of institutional trust is by far the most important one, reaching levels comparable to the 
performance variables. As for conceptions of liberal democracy, they are enhanced by 
education and political interest (above all in NWE, but much less so (political interest) or not 
at all (education) in authoritarian countries). We also find the expected curvilinear effect of 
left-right ideology in all regions, but especially again in NWE.  
Figure 5 presents the direct and total effects of the performance indicators for social 
democracy13. As expected, both direct and total effects are even stronger for social than for 
liberal democracy. With respect to evaluations, the pattern of the effects is quite similar to 
that for liberal democracy, except that the maximum effect of the combined political and 
economic satisfaction now reaches up to 4.9 (2.007+2.898) and 5.0 (2.310+2.691) on the -5 
to +5 scale for authoritarian and CEE countries respectively, compared to a still sizeable 2.7 
(1.505+1.160) in NWE. In terms of conceptions, we find again unexpected direct positive 
effects of satisfaction with government on support for social democratic principles, not only 
in authoritarian countries, but also in the countries of other regions. However, these effects 
are hardly significant and are counter-acted by indirect negative effects. In total, in none of 
the regions does satisfaction with the government’s performance have any significant effect 
on demands for social democracy. By contrast, satisfaction with economic performance has a 
very strong effect on demands for social democracy: the direct effect is enhanced indirectly to 
reach a total of -3.75 in CEE, -3.17 in authoritarian and -2.77 in SE countries. This is to 
suggest that economic (but not political) dissatisfaction leads even more to demands for 
social than for liberal democracy in the countries hardest hit by the crisis. The critical 
                                                          
13 This figure and the following figure are based on Table A3 in the online appendix. 
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citizens’ hypothesis is once again confirmed by the fact that dissatisfaction with the way 
social democracy works also enhances demands for social democracy. In the case of social 
democracy, the reciprocal relationship between conceptions and evaluations is mutually 
negative, with negative evaluations being especially meted out by the more demanding 
citizens. Let us note in passing that the pattern of control effects is similar to that for liberal 
democracy. There is only one notable difference in this respect: social democratic 
conceptions of democracy are much more present on the left in NWE and to some extent in 
SE, but not at all on the left in authoritarian countries. 
 <Figure 5> 
Figure 6 finally presents the direct and total effects of the performance indicators on direct 
democratic evaluations and conceptions. In this respect, satisfaction with government still has 
a strong effect on the evaluations of direct democracy, but less so for the corresponding 
conceptions. Moreover, the effects of satisfaction with economic performance are generally 
weaker than for the other two visions of democracy, except for evaluations in authoritarian 
regimes, which are still heavily influenced by satisfaction with economic performance. 
 <Figure 6> 
Conclusion 
We have come a long way from the crisis debate of the 1970s via the ‘normality hypothesis’ 
of the 1990s to the observation of a double effect of the Great Recession on the evaluations 
and conceptions of democracy in Europe that emerges from the present analysis. Sum-
marizing the impact of the Euro crisis on democracy in Europe, we should first insist on the 
fact that, across Europe, the principles of democracy are not put into question. Europeans all 
share the same basic model of liberal democracy. If anything, the citizens of the countries in 
Southern and Eastern Europe that have been hardest hit by the crisis have more maximalist 
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conceptions of liberal democracy than Northern Europeans. The same applies to conceptions 
of social democracy, which are complementary to conceptions of liberal democracy and 
constitute an integral part of democracy for a large part of the European citizenry, and which 
are clearly more strongly supported in Southern and Eastern than in Northern Europe. It is as 
if those who are living in countries with less developed welfare states and lower quality 
liberal democracies are more sensitive to the democratic principles.  
Second, in the aftermath of the economic crisis, Southern Europeans have become 
disillusioned politically, with respect to both domestic and European politics. However, we 
do not find a similar impact of the crisis in the two other regions of Europe. In NWE, citizens 
remain largely satisfied with their national politics, while the citizens in CEE have already 
been disenchanted with their domestic politics long before the Great Recession.  
Third, with regard to the direct impact of the crisis, the perceived poor performance of the 
economy and of the government in the crisis, indeed, leads citizens across Europe to evaluate 
the way their national democracy works more critically – especially in the hard hit regions of 
CEE and SE, and in authoritarian countries. However, and most importantly, we also found 
that this critical evaluation of democracy does not undermine the citizens’ support for 
democracy. Quite to the contrary: democratic principles are actually strengthened by the 
dissatisfaction of the citizens with the economic and political performance of their countries 
in the crisis! By creating ‘critical citizens,’ the economic crisis contributes to the 
strengthening of democratic principles. This may sound counter-intuitive to many a reader, 
but this is what the analysis of the ESS data from Europe in the Great Recession is telling us. 
This analysis vindicates the ‘critical citizens’ hypothesis and contradicts the ‘spill-over’ 
hypothesis. It suggests that it is misleading to fear for the future of European democracies. 
The anti-dote for the poor performance of contemporary European democracies in political 
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and economic terms is not less, but more democracy, especially more social democracy – at 
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Tables and figures 
Figure 1: Satisfaction with democracy: shares of fairly/very satisfied citizens 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 




Table 1: average conceptualizations, evaluations of liberal and social democracy by region,  
  liberal democracy social democracy direct democracy 
  regional means regional means regional means 
  Raw index eval- raw index eval- raw index eval- 
  views views uations views views uations views views uations 
all 8.3 4.3 0.99 8.5 4.7 -1.09 8.3 3.9 -0.12 
north 8.3 4.8 1.88 8.1 3.5 0.33 8.1 3.1 0.73 
south 8.5 4.8 0.68 9.0 6.0 -1.74 8.2 4.0 -1.02 
east 8.4 4.6 0.53 8.5 5.2 -2.16 8.5 4.5 -0.35 








Figure 2: Simple model for the determination of conceptions and evaluations of democracy in 
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Table 2: Determinants of liberal-democratic evaluations and conceptions by region: direct 
effects, z-values and P-values 
  evaluations   conceptions   Satisfaction w government 
  coef z P>z coef z P>z coef z P>z 
conceptions                   
NWE 0.140 24.650 0.000 
  
    
 
  
SE 0.099 7.950 0.000 
  
    
 
  
CEE 0.087 10.120 0.000 
  
    
 
  
authoritarian 0.162 8.830 0.000 
  
    
 
  




    
 
  
NWE   
 
  -0.109 -3.250 0.001   
 
  
SE   
 
  -0.038 -0.690 0.488   
 
  
CEE   
 
  -0.151 -4.160 0.000   
 
  
authoritarian       -0.540 -8.840 0.000       
Satisf govt                   
NWE 0.588 11.360 0.000 -0.963 -8.180 0.000   
 
  
SE 1.336 15.040 0.000 -0.913 -4.630 0.000   
 
  
CEE 1.421 19.500 0.000 -0.890 -5.910 0.000   
 
  
authoritarian 1.697 11.600 0.000 1.124 3.970 0.000   
 
  




    
 
  
NWE 0.428 9.570 0.000 0.240 2.270 0.023 0.393 76.760 0.000 
SE 0.315 3.280 0.001 -2.034 -10.880 0.000 0.507 50.230 0.000 
CEE 0.398 5.150 0.000 -1.840 -12.770 0.000 0.490 70.280 0.000 
authoritarian 1.192 7.450 0.000 -2.376 -9.220 0.000 0.524 46.670 0.000 




    
 
  
NWE 0.047 2.820 0.005 
  
  0.059 27.080 0.000 
SE 0.102 2.730 0.006 
  
  0.066 13.910 0.000 
CEE 0.144 5.170 0.000 
  
  0.090 29.990 0.000 
authoritarian 0.225 4.070 0.000 
  
  0.086 17.150 0.000 




    
 
  
NWE 2.460 43.670 0.000 
  
  0.489 72.740 0.000 
SE 2.024 19.780 0.000 
  
  0.399 32.130 0.000 
CEE 1.830 24.450 0.000 
  
  0.385 49.930 0.000 
authoritarian 2.187 15.270 0.000 
  
  0.394 32.410 0.000 




    
 
  
NWE 0.431 9.450 0.000 
  
  0.034 9.430 0.000 
SE 0.463 5.710 0.000 
  
    
 
  
CEE 0.791 14.180 0.000 
  
    
 
  
authoritarian -0.140 -1.270 0.203 
  
    
 
  




    
 
  
[*]/NWE -0.154 -7.200 0.000 1.830 28.870 0.000   
 
  
SE   
 
  1.177 11.680 0.000   
 
  
CEE   
 
  0.245 2.640 0.008   
 
  
authoritarian   
 
  -0.039 -0.260 0.796   
 
  










NWE   
 
  2.239 31.060 0.000 -0.063 -12.420 0.000 
SE   
 
  1.326 12.090 0.000 -0.035 -3.970 0.000 
CEE   
 
  1.465 15.740 0.000 0.006 0.870 0.383 
authoritarian   
 
  0.692 4.610 0.000 0.015 1.460 0.144 




    
 
  
NWE   
 
  -3.244 -9.840 0.000   
 
  
SE   
 
  -2.625 -5.870 0.000   
 
  
CEE   
 
  -1.888 -5.410 0.000   
 
  
authoritarian   
 
  -2.172 -2.890 0.004   
 
  




    
 
  
NWE   
 
  2.040 6.530 0.000   
 
  
SE   
 
  1.693 4.100 0.000   
 
  
CEE   
 
  2.347 7.300 0.000   
 
  
authoritarian   
 
  2.887 4.540 0.000   
 
  




    
 
  
NWE   
 
  6.410 42.790 0.000   
 
  
SE   
 
  6.436 28.840 0.000   
 
  
CEE   
 
  7.470 45.860 0.000   
 
  
authoritarian       7.650 26.480 0.000   
 
  
_cons                   
NWE -0.614 -15.720 0.000 1.651 14.180 0.000 0.026 5.930 0.000 
SE -1.191 -15.310 0.000 4.120 25.910 0.000 0.015 2.480 0.013 
CEE -1.501 -25.600 0.000 3.919 28.260 0.000 0.007 1.610 0.108 
authoritarian -2.836 -24.520 0.000 3.678 12.150 0.000 0.011 1.560 0.119 
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Figure 4: direct and total effects of satisfaction with government and economy on liberal 
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Figure 5: direct and total effects of satisfaction with government and economy on social 
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Figure 6: direct and total effects of satisfaction with government and economy on direct 
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Appendix Table A1: Items for the three visions of democracy in the ESS6 source questionnaire 
How important do you think it is for democracy in general that….. 
Liberal democracy 
- national elections are free and fair 
- voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote 
- different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another 
- opposition parties are free to criticize the government 
- the media are free to criticize the government 
- the media provide citi9zens with reliable information to judge the government 
- the rights of minority groups are protected 
- the courts treat everyone the same 
- the courts are able to stop the government acting beyond its authority 
- governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job 
- the government explains its decisions to voters 
- politicians take into account the views of other European governments before making decisions 
Social democracy 
- The government protects all citizens against poverty 
- The government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels 
Direct democracy 
- Citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in 
referendums 
 
Appendix Table A2: Independent variables: descriptives 
  mean sd min max 
evaluations liberal demo 0.99 1.86 -5 5 
evaluations social demo -1.09 2.71 -5 5 
evaluations direct demo -0.12 3.16 -5 5 
conceptions liberal demo 4.38 3.30 0 10 
conception social demo 4.69 4.49 0 10 
conceptions direct demo 8.27 2.06 0 10 
Satisfaction w economy 0.40 0.26 0 1 
Satisfaction w government 0.40 0.26 0 1 
Winner 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Institutional trust 0.39 0.22 0 1 
Satisfaction w life 0.68 0.24 0 1 
Education 0.54 0.31 0 1 
Political interest 0.45 0.31 0 1 
Left-right self-placement 0.52 0.22 0 1 
Left-right self-placement sq. 0.32 0.24 0 1 





Appendix: Table A3: Determinants of social and direct-democratic evaluations and 
conceptions by region: direct effects, z-values and p-values 
  Evaluation soc democ Conception soc democ Evaluation direct democ Conception direct dem 
  coef z P>z coef z P>z coef z P>z coef z P>z 
conceptions                         
NWE -0.097 -7.43 0.000   
 
  0.512 9.45 0.000   
 
  
SE -0.176 -8.72 0.000   
 
  -0.169 -1.92 0.055   
 
  
CEE -0.092 -6.88 0.000   
 
  0.072 1.35 0.178   
 
  
authoritarian -0.025 -0.98 0.328   
 













   
-0.562 -9.63 0.000 
   
-0.055 -1.99 0.047 
SE 
   
-0.624 -5.87 0.000 
   
0.150 3.55 0.000 
CEE 
   
-0.306 -2.82 0.005 
   
0.014 0.54 0.588 
authoritarian       -0.786 -4.66 0.000       -0.193 -4.11 0.000 
Satisf govt                         
NWE 1.461 15.71 0.000 0.393 1.73 0.084 1.258 9.83 0.000 -0.467 -4.59 0.000 
SE 2.074 15.48 0.000 0.953 2.43 0.015 1.330 7.02 0.000 -0.656 -4.22 0.000 
CEE 2.257 23.08 0.000 0.121 0.32 0.748 1.781 12.56 0.000 -0.468 -4.36 0.000 
authoritarian 2.014 11.87 0.000 1.861 3.22 0.001 2.073 9.04 0.000 0.404 1.93 0.054 
Satisf econ 








NWE 0.468 5.73 0.000 -0.739 -4.55 0.000 -0.250 -2.30 0.021 -0.031 -0.41 0.682 
SE 0.710 4.70 0.000 -1.845 -5.78 0.000 -0.663 -2.68 0.007 -1.538 -11.60 0.000 
CEE 1.238 10.85 0.000 -2.983 -9.82 0.000 0.142 0.95 0.341 -0.622 -6.54 0.000 
authoritarian 1.767 8.98 0.000 -1.867 -3.80 0.000 1.856 7.04 0.000 -1.023 -5.51 0.000 
winner 








NWE 0.025 0.93 0.353   
 
  0.044 1.07 0.286   
 
  
SE -0.089 -1.83 0.068   
 
  0.129 1.65 0.098   
 
  
CEE 0.059 1.62 0.106   
 
  0.103 1.92 0.054   
 
  
authoritarian -0.001 -0.01 0.990   
 












NWE 2.956 28.11 0.000   
 
  3.227 23.14 0.000   
 
  
SE 2.354 15.38 0.000   
 
  2.484 11.58 0.000   
 
  
CEE 1.797 16.94 0.000   
 
  2.116 14.59 0.000   
 
  
authoritarian 2.087 12.44 0.000   
 












NWE -0.411 -8.81 0.000 -0.423 -4.62 0.000 -1.242 -19.33 0.000 -0.264 -4.92 0.000 
SE -0.141 -1.89 0.059 0.270 1.92 0.054 -1.012 -9.94 0.000 0.300 3.77 0.000 
CEE -0.350 -5.31 0.000 -1.614 -12.69 0.000 -0.459 -5.15 0.000 -0.023 -0.38 0.705 
authoritarian -0.064 -0.66 0.510 -0.418 -2.11 0.035 -0.381 -2.87 0.004 -0.111 -1.08 0.280 
Satisf life 








NWE 0.753 10.15 0.000   
 
  0.549 4.84 0.000   
 
  
SE 0.547 5.20 0.000   
 
  0.679 3.80 0.000   
 
  
CEE 0.603 7.74 0.000   
 
  0.984 9.07 0.000   
 
  
authoritarian 0.255 2.06 0.040   
 















   
0.992 10.84 0.000 
   
0.020 0.37 0.712 
SE 
   
0.912 7.08 0.000 
   
0.238 3.07 0.002 
CEE 
   
0.970 7.90 0.000 
   
0.293 4.86 0.000 
authoritarian 
   
0.467 2.39 0.017 
   
0.264 2.67 0.008 
Leftr-right sp                 
NWE    -6.181 -14.33 0.000    -0.773 -3.15 0.002 
SE    -3.783 -7.06 0.000    -1.431 -4.52 0.000 
CEE    -1.807 -3.85 0.000    -0.604 -2.64 0.008 
authoritarian    -0.898 -0.93 0.352    1.592 3.23 0.001 
Left-right sp 2                 
NWE    3.274 8.04 0.000    0.751 3.28 0.001 
SE    3.399 6.88 0.000    0.778 2.64 0.008 
CEE    1.350 3.11 0.002    0.724 3.42 0.001 
authoritarian    0.893 1.09 0.276    -0.726 -1.74 0.082 
Over-report 









   
6.483 29.64 0.000 
   
1.996 17.82 0.000 
SE 
   
6.450 20.18 0.000 
   
1.683 10.61 0.000 
CEE 
   
7.225 32.16 0.000 
   
2.079 19.64 0.000 
authoritarian 
   
6.903 18.92 0.000 
   
2.219 11.91 0.000 
_cons 








NWE -2.054 -22.70 0.000 5.022 26.38 0.000 -4.901 -10.57 0.000 8.571 100.36 0.000 
SE -2.423 -15.64 0.000 4.586 12.41 0.000 -0.409 -0.56 0.578 8.966 75.91 0.000 
CEE -3.595 -34.21 0.000 5.943 12.75 0.000 -2.558 -5.40 0.000 8.499 87.95 0.000 
authoritarian -4.116 -21.32 0.000 3.369 4.37 0.000 -5.106 -6.84 0.000 7.460 31.61 0.000 




























authoritarian 0.270     0.150     0.120     0.040     
 
 
